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CHRISTIANITY AND THE (MODEST) RULE OF LAW 
David A. Skeel, Jr.
' 
& William J Stuntz** 
INTRODUCTION 
Legality is the central commitment of American government. 
Ours is a country where law rules, and law rules everyone--Iaw's em­
pire extends to governors as well as those they govern, as our massive 
body of constitutional law attests. 
That commitment is supposed to mean five things. First, when 
the state deprives one of its citizens of life, liberty, or property, the 
deprivation is primarily the consequence of a legal rule, not a discre­
tionary choice. Obviously, discretion exists, and it matters, but the 
key policy judgments that lead to prison terms and damages bills 
should be made by those who define legal rules, not by those who en­
force such rules. The second implication follows from the first: the 
rules in question must have a reasonable measure of specificity. 1 If 
state or federal codes made it a crime to "cause harm" or "do wrong," 
and if defendants were convicted and punished for such crimes, the 
criminal justice system could not claim to follow the rule of law: such 
vague commands do not genuinely command anything. For law to 
rule, it must define the line between behavior that is subject to legal 
penalty and behavior that isn't-not simply declare that the line ex­
ists and leave its definition to law enforcers. 
Third, the rules must be defined in advance of the penalized con­
duct. Officials cannot target some unpopular person and send her 
up the river for behavior that, at the time she engaged in it, was rea­
sonably understood to be permissible. Nor can officials gin up the 
"crime" after the investigation has begun in order to ensure that they 
will have something to prosecute. 
S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. We 
are grateful to Steve Goldberg, Seth Kreimer, Steve Mikochik, Ethan Schrum, Ted Seto, the 
participants in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law's "Law and Relig­
ion" symposium, and the participants at a faculty workshop at Cornell Law School for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts. 
Henry J. Friendly Professor, Harvard Law School. 
I Note that we are using the term "rule" broadly here to encompass any legal regulation, 
rather than in the narrower sense that scholars have in mind when they distinguish benveen 
rules and standards. 
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Fourth, the law must be the same law in different sorts of 
neighborhoods. Some legal wrongs may by their nature be limited by 
class, as Anatole France 's  famous line about sleeping under bridges 
illustrates. 2 Securities violations are committed by people who buy 
and sell stock, just as election law crimes are committed by those who 
run for office or those who help them ge t elected. But when it comes 
to temptations that apply to rich and poor alike, the law must treat 
violators at least roughly the same, regardless of where they hail from 
and how expensive the real estate is there . 
Fifth , the law must not punish intent divorced from conduct. No 
one can know the disposition of another's heart, so law that seeks to 
punish that disposition would inevitably be un-law-like . 
All these commitments apply in theory to civil and criminal justice 
alike , but they apply with special force in criminal cases. Legality is 
supposed to be honored in all the government does, but there is 
some room for play in the joints in civil regulatory systems. This is 
not so in criminal cases. If there is one key condition that must be 
satisfied for a country to call itself free,  it  is that no one can be 
thrown in prison for no better reason than because it pleased some 
government official  to put him there. Legality requires that the law 
put him there. 
That is the way things are supposed to work. The reality of the 
American legal system is different. Civil liability "rules" are often no 
more specific than the principle that regulated actors should behave 
reasonably. What reasonableness means depends on which jury or 
which regulatory agency made the judgment and when.  Criminal jus­
tice is worse. Criminal codes cover a mountain of conduct, much 
more than any prosecutor's office could hope to punish . Police and 
prosecutors pick and choose , and they apply legal rules to one case 
that they would never apply to an other. I n  federal cases, when offi­
cials suspect someone of crimes that are regularly enforced, they of­
ten target him for "crimes" that are virtually never punished. Federal 
agents and prosecutors though t Martha Stewart was guilty of criminal 
insider trading and misdisclosure . The misdisclosure charge was 
dismissed, and insider trading was never actually charged, but Stewart 
went to prison anyway for lying to federal agen ts and obstructing jus­
tice-crimes that are committed every day without legal consequence.  
Sometimes officials generate the crimes in question-just as Kenneth 
Starr's prosecutors and Paula Jones's lawyers created the "perjury 
trap" that almost cost President Bill Clinton his job seven years ago . 
People l ike Stewart go to prison for being famous and unpopular. 
2 "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under 
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." JOHN BARTLETT, FA\1ILlAR QUOTATIONS 655 
(Emily Morison Beck ed. ,  15th ed. 1980) (quoting Al\JATOLE FRA.NCE, LE Lvs ROUGE (1894)). 
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People l ike Clinton go to prison (when they do) just for being fa­
mous-a headline for the agents and prosecutors who take them 
3 down. 
Lawlessness is not merely the lot of rich celebrities. Drug crimes 
in poor city neighborhoods regularly lead to long prison terms.4 Up­
per-class drug crime is treated more generously.� Often it is simply 
ignored since ferre ting it out costs more than police have to spend. 
In short, the rule of law is honored in theory but widely ignored in 
practice. Discretion mostly rules in America's justice system, espe­
cially its criminal justice system-the place where legality is supposed 
to be most sacred. Why? 
We believe the answer comes in two steps . Step one has to do with 
law's  ambition. Judging from appellate opinions and law reviews, 
American law is supposed to do a great deal more than define con­
duct rules and determine litigation outcomes. I t  is supposed to in­
spire , to express our deepest values, to shape our iden tity. Above all ,  
i t  i s  supposed to teach. The various bodies of law that regulate com­
mercial dishonesty seem designed to define a moral code for business 
and finance. Criminal codes likewise look like moral codes, and, like 
moral codes, they are comprehensive: no petty wrong, no act of self­
ishness is too trivial to escape their notice. But misbehavior, selfish­
ness, and dishonest business practices are too common; the legal sys­
tem cannot deal with them all. So, law enforcers must be selective , 
and their selections end up defining the real line between punished 
and permitted behavior. The rule of law becomes a veneer that hides 
the rule of discretion. Notice the relationship :  the more law seeks to 
do, the farther it strays from the modest goal of resolving litigation 
outcomes, the bigger the role discretion plays in the actual operation 
of the legal system. The rule of law works only if law does not seek to 
rule too much. 
The second step has to do with an unlikely subject: Christian 
theology. Christianity too sees law as a beautiful thing that deligh ts 
the soul and serves as a source of inspiration and wise teaching on 
how to l ive life well. But the law that does all these good things is not 
meant for code books and courtrooms; it exists to govern th e hearts 
3 For a more detailed discussion of pre textual prosecutions like Martha Stewart's and ( if  
impeachment counts as a prosecution)  Bill Clinton's, see Daniel C. Richman & William J. 
Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. 
L. REv. 583 (2005). 
4 See Will iam J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1 795 , 1832 (1998) [herein­
after Stun tz, Race, Class, and Drugs] ( explaining how the criminal justice system targets drug 
markets in poor city neighborhoods for a variety of often defensible reasons, but the dispropor­
tionate presence in poor neighborhoods produces a perception of discriminatory treatment) .  
S See id. at 1821-22 (discussing the costs and burdens of investigating upper-class drug 
crime) .  
.: ... 
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of the men and women God made in His image. Jesus' discussion of 
adultery and murder in the Sermon on the Mount proves the point: 
as He defines them, the prohibitions against these acts are ones that 
no legal system, ancient or modern, could possibly enforce.6 
Christianity also contains the seeds of the rule of law: the ideas 
that all men and women have dignity in God's eyes, and that all need 
governing because all are prone to sin.7 Yet, different rules exist for 
Martha Stewart than for the rest of us; different rules exist for the 
teenage boys who deal crack in city neighborhoods than for their 
counterparts who sell cocaine powder in the suburbs; different rules 
exist for cases that land on different prosecutors' desks. These things 
are not consistent with the Christian conception of who we are: men 
and women made in the Father's image, all of whom have strayed 
from His ways like lost sheep.8 Christianity seems to require the rule 
of law, yet its vision of law is one that cannot function without mas­
sive, un-law-like discretion-discretion that violates all five of the tra­
ditional rule-of-law principles. The solution to this seeming inconsis­
tency is the rule of two kinds of law: one for hearts and minds, and 
the other for code books and courtrooms. Only God's law is fit for 
the former purpose. Law that operates in the latter territories must 
have more humble ambitions. 
To put the point more simply, the bodies of law that govern 
twenty-first-century America generally draw lines between good and 
bad, proper and improper behavior. Such laws cannot possibly gov­
ern; there is simply too much bad conduct. Good moral codes make 
for bad legal codes. Laws that aspire to teach citizens how to live and 
at the same time seek to govern the imposition of tangible legal pen­
alties are likely only to teach lessons in arbitrary government and the 
rule of discretion. Perhaps God intended that His law should be the 
exclusive source of such moral teaching. If laws that govern men's 
and women's affairs are to function as law, and not as a cover for offi­
cial discretion, they need to pursue a more modest agenda. 
Part I of this essay briefly explores the Christian conception of law. 
The various restrictions that travel under the label of legality follow 
naturally from Christian premises. But God's law violates all those re­
strictions. And God's law is likewise seen in Christian scripture as a 
source of inspiration, joy, and wisdom. It could not provide those 
benefits if it remained within rule-of-Iaw boundaries. Law can teach 
6 The most detailed account of the Sermon on the Mount is recorded in Matthew:5 (English 
Standard). Christ's teachings about adultery and murder appear at Matthew 5:27-28 (adultery) 
and Matthew 5:21-26 (murder). Unless othen-'Iise noted, all subsequent translations of the Bible 
are from the English Standard Version, which is available at http://www.gnpcb.org/esv/. 
7 See, e.g., Romans 3:23 (stating that "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God"). 
8 See, e.g., [wiah 53:6 ("All we like sheep have gone astray . . . .  ") ; I Peter 2:25 ("For YOLl were 
straying like sheep . . . .  ") . 
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us how to live or it can send us to prison when we live especially 
badly. It cannot do both. 
Part II takes up the laws that do send people to prison, along with 
the civil laws that govern business relationships. Here we explore 
why, as law covers ever more territory, it must become ever less law­
like. And twenty-first-century American law covers a very broad terri­
tory indeed. We suggest that its broad scope follows naturally from its 
high ambition. If our society is to recover the rule of law, it must be a 
more modest law that rules. 
I. THE RULE OF GOD'S LAW 
There is no Equal Protection Clause in the Bible, no guarantee 
that God will treat all His creatures the same. Nor is there any ex­
plicit command that earthly governments do so. C.S. Lewis, perhaps 
the most broadly influential Christian thinker of the twentieth cen­
tury, argued that equality is no part of God's world, that Heaven is a 
place of radical inequality. ""Vhy else were individuals created," Lewis 
asked, "but that God, loving all infinitely, should love each differ­
ently?,
,9 Even so, there are important family resemblances between 
the teachings of Christian scripture, on the one hand, and equal pro­
tection and other rule-of-Iaw principles on the other. These resem­
blances follow directly from two of the Bible's central themes. 
First, the Bible teaches that each of us is made in God's image. 
"And God created the human in his image," we read in the account 
of creation in the Bible's very first chapter.1o " [I]n the image of God 
He created him, male and female He created them."!! This theme 
runs through all of the Christian scriptures, Old and New Testaments 
alike. VVhen the Jews were tempted to worship the idols of the na­
tions that surrounded them, the prophets reminded them that, 
whereas idols are fashioned by the hands of men, they had been 
made by and in the image of God.12 The Apostle Paul declares that 
"we are [God's] workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, 
which God prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them.,,!3 
VVhenJesus was asked whether it was proper for observant Jews to pay 
taxes to Caesar, he noted that Caesar's image was on the questioner'S 
coins and then said: "[ t] herefore render to Caesar the things that are 
9 c.s. LEYvlS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 150 (MacMillan 1962) (1940). 
to 
This quotation is taken from Robert Alter's splendid new translation of the five books of 
Moses. ROBERT ALTER, THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES: A TRAl'.iSLATION WITH COMMENTARY 19 
(2005) (ci ling Genesis 1:27) . 
II 
Id. 
12 Isaiah 46:1-4. 
13 r_1Jhesians 2: 10. 
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Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.
,,
!'1 This is a clear ref­
erence to the image of God stamped on us all. 
The second theme is as disheartening as the first is uplifting. The 
Bible tells us that each one of us has sinned-even more, that the de­
sire to sin is woven into our very being. "[T] here is none who does 
good, not even one," David says in the Psalms.15 "They have all 
turned aside .... ,,!6 Picking up on this theme, the New Testament 
pronounces that "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God.,,!7 
None of us is perfect or anywhere close to it. More than that, we are 
all radically imperfect-prone to selfishness and exploitation, ready to 
seize opportunities for our own advancement even if doing so brings 
injury and injustice to others. Sin is not just what we do (though we 
do a lot of it); it is who we are. 
The first of these themes suggests that everyone deserves to be 
treated with dignity. Caesar's image stood for Rome's power; the face 
on a coin in the ancient world was a sign of the respect that power 
commanded. IS God's image in each of us likewise commands respect. 
And since the image is shared by rich and poor alike, so too is the 
dignity that the image conveys. That is one respect in which the Bible 
definitely is egalitarian. Again and again, we are told to care for the 
poor, widows, and strangers-those who lack the means to care for 
themselves or the networks to get others to care for them. The 
Psalms pray for a king who "delivers the needy when he calls, the 
poor and him who has no helper.
,,19 AndJesus told his followers that 
whatever they do to care for "the least of these [his] brothers," they 
do for him: a clear statement that he identifies with those at the bot­
tom of the ladder, not those at the top.20 
An obvious implication of the second theme-that all of us are 
sinners-is that we need to be governed, restrained from acting on 
our worst impulses. If we were simply left to our own devices, our sin 
would produce chaos. It is important to underscore, moreover, that 
since all of us sin, the need for government is universal; no one is ex­
empt from this need for oversight. Those who govern-the lawmak­
ers who make the laws and the police, prosecutors, regulators, and 
judges who enforce them-do not stand outside ana apart from sin; 
14 Nlalthew 22:21. 
15 Psalm 14:3. 
iii 
fel. 
17 Romans 3:23. 
1M I t  is  for this reason that the early Christian pronouncement that 'jesus is Lord" was a radi­
cal political statement, a challenge to Caesar's claim of ultimate authority . This theme is ex­
plored in detail in OUVER O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NAnO�S: REDISCOVERlNG THE 
ROOTS OF POUTICAL THEOLOGY (1996). 
19 Psalm 72:12. 
�(J J\I[auheuJ 25:40. 
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they too are in its grasp. It follows that the governors need to be gov­
erned, just like the rest of us. 
Weave these two threads together and one sees a familiar fabric. 
Government is essential to avoid lives that are, in Hobbes' famous 
phrase, "nasty, brutish, and short.,
,
21 But that government should 
treat even those it punishes with the dignity and respect due to crea­
tures made in God's image. If anything, that requirement is height­
ened when the government's wrath is visited on the poor, who are 
usually the recipients of criminal punishment. And, since sin is uni­
versal and since those who govern must themselves be governed, law 
(not government officials) must do the restraining. Rulers must sub­
mit to the same rules they apply to others. There is one more reason 
why law rather than discretion must be the driving force behind offi­
cial punishment. If discretion governs, those who punish must have 
clean hands; they must stand in a superior moral position relative to 
those they condemn. But the Bible teaches that no one has clean 
hands; none of us can fairly claim moral superiority.22 So no one can 
pass judgment. Only the law itself can do so. 
These Biblical principles lead, in other words, to the same rule-of­
law principles that our legal system purports to honor. Clearly articu­
lated rules,23 not jurors' or judges' whims, should be the basis for de­
cisions that impose criminal or civil liability on the state's citizens. 
This principle follows from the proposition that those whims are in 
part the product of sin: discretionary power means the power to op­
press, something all power-holders are tempted to do. So, too, the 
rules must have a reasonable measure of specificity. While no legal 
system can define permissible and impermissible behavior in intricate 
detail, the line between the DNO should be reasonably clear. Other­
wise, we are right back in the world of unbounded discretion, with 
prosecutors and regulators holding all the cards. For the same rea­
son, the rules should be specified in advance; if not, officials will be 
tempted to apply different and harsher rules to those they target than 
to the rest of the population. Likewise, the same rules must apply to 
rich and poor alike, if. all are to be treated with the dignity and re­
spect that is due to creatures made in God's image. And since that 
image does not vary with skin color or neighborhood, the same rules 
should apply to all races, ethnicities, and social classes. Finally, be­
cause none of us is in a position to judge another's thoughts or incli-
tl THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 96 (A.P. Maninich ed., Broadview Literary Texts 2002) 
(1651) . 
"" See Psalm 14:3 ("They have all turned aside; wgether they have become corrup t; there is 
none who does good, not even one."); Romans 3:23 ("[FJor all have sinned and fall shan of the 
glory of God .... ") . 
"" 
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nations-only the Lord, as God told Samuel,  can look on a person's 
heare4-the law should punish conduct, and never intent alone. 
The rule of law thus follows quite naturally from Christian prem­
ises. But how can this be reconciled with God 's  law itself? Consider 
how God's  law is portrayed in the New Testament. The most familiar 
summary of God 's  law is the Golden Rule: Christ 's command that we 
love God with all of our heart, soul, and mind, and that we love our 
neighbors as we love ourselves. 25 Whatever else one can say about this 
twin command, it does not conform to the principle that rules must 
be defined with reasonable specificity. On the contrary, one can 
barely imagine a more vague and open-ended legal requirement. 
Perhaps the vagueness is nothing more than the inevitable conse­
quence of the fact that Jesus is summarizing God 's  law, rather than 
spelling it out in detail .  But Christ's more detailed pronouncements 
are likewise at odds with traditional rule-of-Iaw principles. In the 
Sermon on the Mount, Jesus defines as murderers "evegone who is 
angry with his brother," even those who say, '''You fool! 
,
, ,2 Adulterers 
include not only those who have sexual relations with others' spouses ,  
but  "everyone who looks at  a woman with lustful intent. ,,27 Plainly, 
these broad definitions violate the principle that punishment should 
be based on conduct, not intent alone.  
Their breadth also violates the principle that rules, not discretion ,  
should determine who pays legal penalties. No legal system that de­
fined murder and adultery as Jesus did could enforce those offenses 
with any consistency. Such laws would function like highway speed 
limits-all drivers violate them, so the real law is whatever state troop­
ers decide . And Jesus himself applied God's law differently to differ­
ent people, violating the principle that all should be bound by the 
same rules. Recall the rich young ruler who asks Jesus what he must 
do to obtain eternal life.28 Jesus first tells the wealthy man that he 
must "keep the commandments" if he wants to "have eternal l ife .
,,29 
When the man says " [a] II these I have kept," Jesus instructs the man 
to sell everything he owns, give it to the poor, and follow him.3D No­
where else in the New Testament does Jesus impose this obligation 
on his followers generally, or indeed on anyone else. 
2 4  See 1 Samuel 16:7 (" [M]an looks on the outward appearance, but the LORD looks on the 
heart."). 
25 See, e.g. ,  Matthew 7:12 ("So whatever you wish that others would do to you, do also to them, 
for this is the Law and the Prophets.").  
2 6  Matthew 5:22. 
27 Matthew 5:28. 
�8 See Matthew 19: 16. 
29 Matthew 19:16-17. 
30 Matthew 19:20-21. 
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God's law, as Jesus teaches and applies it ,  violates every single 
principle that flies under the banner of the "rule of law." If the state 
tried to replicate this law in a legal code, police and prosecutors 
would have total, absolute discretion to choose who should be sent to 
prison and who should go free ;  and civil law regulators could pick 
their least  favorite CEO and punish him or her whenever they chose. 
In practice,  the discretionary choices of the governors ,  rather than 
God's  law itself, would govern the people . Yet the same Bible that 
seems to flout rule-of-Iaw norms also seems to require th ose norms. 
How is the circle to be squared? 
The answer is that two different kinds of law are at issue. Rule-of­
law norms derive from the practical realities of controlling wrongdo­
ing in a world filled with wrongdoing-a world in which all sin bu t 
only some sinners can be punished, where rulers are prone to favorit­
ism and exploitation while those they rule need wise laws to protect 
them from one another. In such a world, law must play a double 
game: restrain ing the worst wrongs by the citizenry without empow­
ering judges and prosecutors to do wrong themselves. Th e key to 
playing that double game well is to limit law's reach . Only the most 
destructive and most readily verifiable wrongs should be forbidden ,  
because forbidding more would turn punishment over to the discre­
tion of law enforcers.  
God's law is not bound by those limits, because it plays no double 
game.  The Lawmaker need not restrain Himself. He is not the prob­
lem. We are . His law can therefore be comprehensive , covering all 
wrongs, not just those that a given society can afford to punish. His 
law is not limited to conduct, because the God in whose image we are 
made sees the thoughts that lie behind conduct. Nothing is hidden 
from Him. His law covers everything, all of life-it is not law defined 
by its limits, but law without limits. 
That limitless, comprehensive quality is closely tied to another fea­
ture that receives a great deal of commen t  in scripture : law's deligh t­
fulness. The beauty of God' s  law, and the sheer joy it  imparts, is a 
frequent theme of the Psalms. "The law of the LORD is perfect," 
David marvels, "reviving th e soul . . .  the rules of the LORD are true ,  
and righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold, 
even much fine gold; sweeter also than honey and drippings of the 
honeycomb.,,31 Another psalmist proclaims, with evident relish,  that 
" I  will meditate on your precepts and fix my eyes on your ways . I will 
delight in your statutes; I will not forge t your word.,,32 "Your testimo­
nies are wonderful ," he goes on to say, " therefore my soul keeps 
them. The unfolding of your words gives light; it  imparts understand-
3l Psalm 19:7,9-10. 
32 Psalm 119;15-16. 
818 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W [Vol. 8:4 
ing to the simple. I open my mouth and pant, because I long for 
d ,,3f your cornman ments .  
This language sounds strange to twenty-first-century American 
ears: delight and longing are hardly the first things that come to 
n1ind for n10st of us when we think about law. But the responses are 
not as strange as they first seem. Most of us have had, at one time or 
another, great teachers who inspired and delighted their classes . The 
best teachers and the best teaching do that. It should come as no 
surprise that God's  wisdom-better teaching than one finds in the 
best-run classroom-prompts the same reaction.  And wisdom is pre­
cisely what a comprehensive moral law provides. C .S .  Lewis put it 
well ,  though incompletely, when he called God 's  law "the 'real ' or 
'correct' or stable, well-grounded, directions for living.,,34 "Directions 
for living" sounds prosaic, but the portions of scripture that provide 
those directions most explicitly are anything but. The Ten Com­
mandments and the Sermon on the Mount are , among other things , 
great literature , more poetry than prose. That, too, should come as 
no surprise . A well-lived life is a beautiful thing to behold, a source of 
delight and inspiration to those fortunate enough to see it. The 
principles that define such a life are likewise beautiful to behold, and 
they are natural subjects for great literature . 
Legal codes are not natural subjects for great literature ,  which is 
why Exodus 22 : 1-15 ,  the passage that defines punishments for various 
offenses against property rights, reads so differently than Exodus 20: 1-
1 7 , the passage that defines both God 's relationship with us ( the first 
four commandments) and our relationships with one another ( the 
last six) . Exodus 22 reads like what it is: a legal code , designed to 
specify conduct rules and punishments to be imposed by human be­
ings on other human beings .  Exodus 20 reads like what it is : a code 
for the life of the soul, not merely the life of buying and selling. 
Notice that the very features that make God's law delightful-its 
depth and comprehensiveness, the way it  addresses both the worst 
wrongs and the deepest longings of our hearts and minds-also make 
it impossible to use as a code to be enforced by, and against, sinful 
men and women. The principle of legality exists to constrain the 
power of human beings: police officers, prosecutors, and judges . 
God 's  law has no human law enforcers, so it  needs no such con­
straint. 
This sounds like dualism. God' s  law, we seem to be suggesting, is 
made for another world, whereas our legal codes operate in this 
world. The truth is otherwise . God's law is likewise made for this 
world, for His world; otherwise it would not be so concerned with 
33 Psalm 119: 129-3l. 
34 C.S. LEWIS, REFLECTIONS ON THE PSALMS 60 (1958). 
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teaching us how to live . But the Ten Commandments and the Ser­
mon on the Mount are not  made for the world of prosecutors' offices 
and prisons, courtrooms and jury boxes . No comprehensive moral 
code , no system of law that judges though ts as well as deeds , no law 
that forbids not just adultery but lust and not just murder but unjusti­
fied anger, can serve as a code for judges and juries . 
I I .  THE RULE OF MAN'S LAw 
Judged by the sheer volume of legal doctrine , twen ty-first-century 
America is among the most law-bound societies in human history. 
Judged by common legal practice , it is not a society that regularly 
honors principles of legality-notwithstanding our purported com­
mitment to those principles. The second statement follows naturally 
from the first: the law of code books and case reporters cannot rule 
when it covers too much territory. And our law covers a great deal of 
territory. 
Consider first the civil justice system .  I ndividuals must behave rea­
sonably, mean ing they must obey the Golden Rule ( i . e . ,  take account 
of the costs of their ac tivity to o thers as they take accoun t of costs to 
themselves) or risk tort liabil ity when they cause harm . Of course , 
the negligence standard has been around for a very long time . But it 
has not always taken its present form. The common law bounded 
negligence liability with defenses like contributory negligence and as­
sumption of risk, with narrow causation doctrines and with limited 
duties of care . The few plaintiffs who could overcome those obstacles 
faced strict limits on remedies: damages for physical injury but not 
for physical or emotional pain,  damages for property damage but not 
for economic loss. The Golden Rule was not enforced across the 
board; liability was much more limited than that. Today, liability is a 
great deal broader and, no t coincidentally, its boundaries are a great 
deal less certain and less law-like . 
That is just tort law. Similar stories can be told about other com­
mon-law liability regimes. And a host of statutory systems establish 
civil liability in areas that were unknown at common law. Many of 
those liability regimes are good and useful . Rules that limit or forbid 
pollution and securities fraud,  dangerous workplaces and discrimina­
tory hiring practices are all signs of legal progress. But progress has 
come at the price of broad, negligence-like l iability regimes that 
mean whatever juries or gove rnment regulators decide they mean. 
Civil l iability regimes often seem in tension with rule-of-Iaw norms, 
but the degree of the tension is limited by the nature of the liability. 
If all manufacturers of dangerous products are liable for damages 
(generously defined) to those who suffer injuries attributable to those 
products, a large frac tion of serious injuries will prompt lawsuits, be­
cause olaintiffs and their lawyers stand to make money from those 
1 ! 
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lawsuits.  The law wil l  be litigated to the margin,  or nearly SO. 35 If li­
ability is grossly excessive , courts will see the consequences of the ex­
cess and (one hopes) take steps to remedy the problem. At least to 
some degree, the system is self-correcting. 
That is not true of criminal liability rules. The state has a practical 
monopoly on enforcing such rules and no one vvins a bounty when 
the rules are successfully enforced. Because no one has an incentive 
to enforce those rules across the board, there is no self-correcting 
mechanism. I ndeed, legal excess is actually self-reinforcing. If Con­
gress passes an overbroad criminal statute , one of two things is likely 
to happen. Federal agents and p rosecutors may use the statute only 
occasionally, as a means of inducing guilty pleas from defendants 
suspected of other crimes. That use is largely invisible: its effect is to 
make criminal convictions cheaper, which is something both Con­
gress and prosecutors want. The other possibility is that a few prose­
cutors will use the statute against defendants who do not deserve to 
be punished, much like the independent counsels of the 1 990s tried 
to enforce overbroad federal crimes against the politicians caugh t in 
their crosshairs .36 Those investigations ruined the reputations of the 
prosecutors who pressed them. But they did not lead to demands 
that Congress narrow the relevant  federal statutes.37 The contrast is 
telling. 
The result is that criminal law proliferates. Legislatures regularly 
add crimes and rarely remove them. Criminal codes become ever 
broader and ever more cluttered with obscure, outmoded prohibi­
tions just waiting for some entrepreneurial prosecutor to use them to 
extrac t a more favorable plea bargain. 38 The fraction of the popula­
tion that is guilty of one or another jailable offense grows ever lar­
ger.39 The disc retionary power of police officers and prosecutors 
grows with it. 
:15 This is the intuition behind the longstanding debate over the efficiency (or not) of the 
common law. For a good recent survey of the debate, see Paul H.  Rubin, MicTO and lV1acro Legal 
Efficiency: SujJPly and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 19 (2005 ).  
36 See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 590-94 (describing the various ways in which inde­
pendent counsels used broadly defined crimes to pursue either innocent or only marginally 
guilty politicians). 
37 See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 1 1 7  HARv. L. 
REv. 2548,2557 (2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Plea Bargaining] (explaining that the public blamed 
Congress only for its prosecutorial role in Clinton's impeachment, not for its original passage of 
the law giving rise to the impeachment). The discussion that follows in the text draws in the 
reasoning in this Article. 
38 See id. at 2558 (describing the legislature's tendency to gradually add new criminal prohi­
bitions without deleting any of the old ones). 
39 Notice that the share of the population that is guilty of violating the criminal code is in­
dependent of the inmate population. The former depends on the scope of criminal codes. 
The latter depends primarily on prosecutors' charging decisions. 
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Broad as it is ,  that discre tionary power is substantially constrained 
when the police officers and prosecutors work for city or county gov­
ernments .  Those governments operate under severe budget con­
straints; the last thirty years have seen massive docket increases with 
only modest increases in personnel.40 The consequence is that, at 
least in high-crime jurisdictions, prosecutors lack the time to go after 
the kinds of offenses the pursuit of which made Ken Starr infamous. 41 
The many rococo crimes that litter state codes do not matter much;  
prosecutors focus instead on core violent crimes, major thefts, and 
drug deals. 42 Drug crime aside, the rule of law functions better than 
one would suspect from a glance at the code books. 
In federal court, by contrast, the rule of law barely functions at al l .  
Federal prosecutors are much be tter fun ded than are their local 
counterparts .43 And they have a much smaller range of responsibili­
ties-if murderers or rapists go unpunished, the local district attor­
ney may lose h is job, while United States attorneys are free to go after 
the cases they think matter most or the cases most likely to yield 
headlines. The federal code gives them an enormous array of charg­
ing options. There are hundreds ( literally) of fraud and misrepre­
sentation statutes ,  covering a large fraction of the lies and almost-but­
not-quite lies anyone migh t tell . 44 Very little dishonesty is ac tually 
punished. During Clin ton 's  impeachment hearings, people scoured 
the case reporters looking for examples of sex-related lies during 
depositions that led to criminal charges.  The lies themselves are 
surely common (consider how many civil cases involve allegations of 
sexual misconduct) , but only a handful of cases were found, with 
none being factually similar to Clinton's  case .45 Yet, if federal fraud 
40 Srun tz, Plea BaT gaining, supra note 37, at 2555-56 & nn.9-13, and sources c i ted therein. 
41 See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 600-08, (discussing the reasons behind prosecu­
tors' inability to pursue these cases) . 
42 See id. at 600. 
43 See generally Richman & Stun tz, supra note 3, at 607 (noting the severe budgetary con­
straints facing local officials as compared with federal officials). 
44 As of 1998, one scholar counted a total of 325 fraud and misrepresen tation statutes. See 
Jeffrey Standen, An Economic /fjrspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 249, 
289 (1998). 
45 During the House impeachment hearings, Alan Dershowitz testified that "the false state­
ments of which President Clinton is accused fall at the most marginal end of the least culpable 
genre of this continuum of offenses and would never even be considered for prosecution in the 
routine case involving an ordinary defendant." The Consequences of Perjury and Related 
Crimes: Hearing BefOTe the H. Comm. on the Judicimy, 105th Congo 87 (1998) (statement of 
Alan M. Dershowitz, Fel ix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School), available 
at http://frwebgateo.access .gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 1 05_house_heari ngs&docid= 
f:53247.waiso In the same hearing, Jeffrey Rosen testified that "neither the independent counsel 
nor anyone else, to my knowledge, has been able to identify a case where a defendant was 
prosecuted, let alone convicted, for peripheral statements in a civil proceeding that he or she 
did not initiate in order to derive some kind of benefit." The Consequences of Pe'ljU7y and Related 
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statutes occasion few prosecutions, collectively those statutes have 
large effects.  They function as a kind of menu-a list of charging op­
tions a prosecutor may pursue once she decides to focus her atten­
tion on a particular suspect. 
Often the targeting comes first, and the charges are an after­
thought. Starr 's investigation began as an effort to uncover crimes 
related to the looting of an Arkansas savings and loan . But Monica 
Lewinsky fell into Starr 's  lap (so to speak) , and the rest is history.46 
So , too ,  federal agents set out to nail Martha Stewart for insider trad­
ing, but when that didn' t  work, got her for lyinf during the course of 
the investigation .47 In Brogan v. United States,4 agents suspected the 
defendant of labor racketeering but were uncertain that they could 
gain a conviction for that crime. So the agents showed up at Bro­
gan 's  home , asked him whether he had taken money from the rele­
vant companies ( the agents knew that the answer was yes and that 
taking the money was not necessarily a crime) ,  and when a startled 
Brogan said no, the agents told him-correctly-that he had just vio­
lated the federal false-statements statute . '19 Brogan 's  conviction under 
that statute was not primarily a consequence of the law; agents '  and 
prosecutors ' discretion mattered much more . In that respect, Brogan 
is typical of federal criminal prosecutions. 
The requirement that law be primary, and discretion secondary, is 
not the only rule-of-Iaw principle that the federal criminal justice sys­
tem regularly violates.  Many federal crimes, including ones that are 
frequently prosecuted, are defined in the vaguest possible terms.  No 
one knows what a "scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intan­
gible right of honest services" is ,50 but thousands of people sit in fed­
eral prison convicted of intangible-rights mail fraud. Brogan's  crime,  
like Clinton ' s  and Martha Stewart's ,  was not  truly a crime before Bro­
gan committed it; the decision to target Brogan came first, after 
which agents maneuvered him into saying the wrong thing, in effect 
talking himself into a prison sentence .'" Furthermore , no one famil-
Crimes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on theJudicia1Y, supra, at 97 (statement of Jeffrey Rosen, Asso­
ciate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School) . 
• 6 
For a good (and scathing) account of the story, see Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and 
Partisanship: Starr's Ole and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 639, 672-73 (1999 ) .  
47 O n  the charges against Stewart, see Constance L Hays, N/artha Stewart Indicted by U.S. on 
Obstruction, NY. TIMES ,June 5,  2003; at A I .  For a defense of thegovernment's tactics, see Scott 
Turow, Op-Ed., Cry No Tears for Martha Stewart, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at A29. 
4 8  522 U.S. 398 ( 1998) . 
49 See id. at 409-10 (Ginsburg, ] . ,  concurring) . 
50 See 18 U.s.c. § 1346 (2000 ) (defining "scheme or artifice to defraud" as including the 
quoted phrase) . 
51 In her concurring opinion in Brogan, Justice Ginsburg explained the danger of this type of 
maneuvering: "if an investigator finds it difficult to prove some elements of a crime, she can ask 
questions about other elements to which she already knows the answers. If the suspect lies, she 
Aug. 2006] CHRlSl1ANITY AND THE (MODEST) RULE OF LA W 823 
iar with federal drug laws would say that the law means the same 
thing in different neighborhoods. Crack cocaine is often sold in out­
door street  marke ts in poor inner-city neighborhoods. Cocaine pow­
der is sold more discreetly, usually in wealthier communities.52 Sell­
ing crack is vastly more like ly to lead to a prison sentence than selling 
cocaine powder because the c rack markets are more easily identified 
by the police . And federal sentencing rules ensure that crack dealers 
pay a much bigger price for their crimes than dealers in cocaine 
powder.53 Although poor whites are much more numerous,  their 
population is more dispersed; Mrican Americans are a large frac tion 
of the urban poor. The upshot is that many young black men are 
treated very differently and much more harshly than young white 
men who commit similar crimes. 
Finally, a number of federal criminal statutes seem to attach 
criminal liability to intent divorced from conduct. The most famous 
example of this phenomenon is the Travel Act, which makes it a fed­
eral felony to cross a state line with the intent to commit any of a long 
list of crimes, including some trivial ones like gambling.54 The only 
conduct element i n  Travel Ac t prosecutions is crossing a state l ine­
hardly a sign of a deep moral failing. It should come as no surprise 
that the Travel Act is largely strategic : it was proposed by then Attor­
ney General Robert Ken nedy in order to give federal prosecutors a 
more effective means of nailing Mafia defendants .55 Today, the fed­
eral government uses the same tactics against suspected terrorists ,  as 
the n-Attorney General John Ashcroft proudly stated: 
Attorney Gen e ral [Robert] Ken nedy made no apologies for using all 
of the available resources in the law to disrupt and disman tle organized 
crime networks. Very often,  prosecutors were aggressive , using obscure 
statutes to arrest and detai n suspected mobsters. One racketeer and his 
father were indicted for lyin g  o n  a federal home loan application . A 
former gunman for the Capone mob was brough t to court on a violation 
of the Migratory Bird Act. Agents found 563 game birds in his freezer-a 
mere 539 birds over the limit. 
can then use the crime � has prompted as leverage or can seek prosecution for the lie as a 
substitute for the crime Ste cannot prove ." Brogan, 522 U.S. at 4 1 1 (quoting Giles A. Birch, 
Comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. CHI.  L. REv. 
1 273 , 1 278 ( 1 990» . 
52 See Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, supra note 4, at 1 808-09 & nn.24-29 ( 1 99 8 ) , and sources 
ci ted therein (describing the differences between markets for crack and cocaine powder) .  
53 For the classic (and still the best) discussion of how those rules came to be, see David A. 
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN . L. REv. 1 283, 1 285-97 ( 1 995 ) .  
54 1 8  U.S.c. § 1 952 (2000) . 
55 See NANCY E. MARION, A H I STORY OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL IN ITIATfVES, 1 960- 1 993, at 
28-30 (Steven A. Egger ed., 1994) (stating that Kennedy proposed eight new laws to fight or­
ganized crime) . .  � . 
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Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, i t  is said,  would arrest mob­
sters for "spitting on the sidewalk" if i t  would help in the battle against  
o rganized crime .  I t  h as been and wi l l  be the policy of this D epartment of 
Justice to use the same aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war 
56 
o n  terror.  
Why does federal criminal law so thoroughly violate rule-of-Iaw 
p rinciples? One reason is institutional. Congress criminalizes 
broadly be cause doing so is cheap; members know that the laws they 
pass will rarely be enforced (and when they are enforced, they will of­
ten be used against people suspected of other,  more serious crimes­
l ike the terrorists and mobsters in  Ashcroft 's  examples) . New crimi­
n al p rohibitions are inexpensive ways of taking a s tand against one or 
another type of crime . The federal Violence Against Women Act 
( "VAWA" ) ,  passed in 1 994,57 produced zero prosecutions in 1 997.58 
In a system l ike that, proliferation of new crimes is natural. The same 
is true of harsh sentencing laws . Tens of thousands of men and 
women sit in federal prison on drug charges; the drug laws are not as 
cheap as VAWA. But those laws are not exac tly expensive either :  the 
total federal prison population is about 1 70,000, compared to l . 9 mil­
lion inmates incarcerated on state-law charges.59 Predictably, state 
legislatures pay some attention to the consequences of harsh sentenc­
ing rules, since those rules cost a great deal of money.60 Congress has 
much more money to spend and its sentencing rules cost less . There 
is little incentive to worry about whether sentencing rules are too 
harsh. 
Institutional incentives go some distance toward explaining the 
gap between rule-of-law norms and federal criminal practice , but not 
the whole distance.  Another explan ation has more to do with ideol­
ogy than institutions.  Federal criminal law has a long history of mor­
alism, dating to the days of the Mann Act6! and Prohibition. The 
small size of the federal enforcement bureaucracy ( the FBI has fewer 
than 1 2 ,000 agents,  compared to 700,000 state and local police offi-
56 Attorney General john Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors' Conference 
(Oct. 25, 200 1 )  (transcript available at http : / /www.usdoj. gov/archive/ag/speeches/ 200 1 /  
agcrisisremarks 1 0_25.htm) . 
57 Pub. L. No. 1 03-322, 1 08 Stat . 190 2  (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.s.c. ) .  
58 SeeJAMES A. STRAZZELL.A, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE FEDERALIZATION O F  CRIMINAL LAw 2 0  ( 1 998) 
(stating that there were no federal prosecutions for "interstate domestic violence" in 1 997) . 
59 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 2003, at 479 tbI .6.2, available at http ://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t62.pdf. 
GO 
For an excellent discussion of the decision-making dynamics in states with sentencing 
guidelines, see Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 7 1 5  ( 2005 ) .  
6 \  The Mann Act made it a crime to knowingly transport any individual fOl- the purpose of 
prostitution or any sexual activity which is forbidden by federal, state , or local law. See 18 U.s.c.  
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cers) 62 makes the federal criminal code an attractive vehicle for taking 
symbolic moral stands. Members of Congress can please constituents 
who wish to condemn the relevant conduct, without paying either the 
fiscal or political price of stopping that conduct. In contrast to legisla­
tion that embodies compromises and tradeoffs, federal criminal law is 
a land of broad "thou shalt nots ,"  leavin g  the compromises and 
tradeoffs for law enforcers .  That is why vice has long played such a 
key role in the field: th e Mann Act's emphasis on sexual immorality, 
Prohibition,  a succession of bans on other narcotics, the Travel Act, 
and other federal gambling prohibitions. 53 "Whatever moral debate 
currently occupies national attention, such as partial birth abortion 
or human cloning, generally ends up adding a crime to Title 1 8 . 
(Perhaps conspiracy to commit gay marriage will soon be a federal 
felony. ) Although the federal government played a large role in en­
forcing Prohibition ,  for the rest of the crimes mentioned in this para­
graph ,  federal cases have been a small share-ten percent or less-of 
total prosecutions.64 The laws in question are means of sending mes­
sages to voters , not sending offenders to prison. 
Something similar happens in the sphere of white-collar crime. 
Consider the large body of criminal law governing corporate and 
commercial misconduct. That law looks l ike a comprehensive code 
of business morality. Each new corporate scandal creates both insti­
tutional incentives to act and the urge to send a moral message . The 
first major securities laws, and the civil and criminal antifraud provi­
sions that came with them, were inspired by the scandals of the 1 930s. 
Stock "pumping," "corners,"  and insider trading were all thought to 
have been rife on Wall Street, so Congress outlawed manipulation , 
"schemes or artifices to defraud, "  and the like . 65 
In the early 1970s, during the Watergate investigations, the special 
prosecutor discovered that many of America's best-known corpora­
tions kep t  slush funds to bribe foreign officials and for other sorts of 
influence-peddling. "The public ,"  observe Bill Bratton and Joe 
McCahery, "already disgusted with corruption in government and 
agitated by the media, now demanded a clean up of corruption in 
62 
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 59, at 42 tbl . l .27 (providing numbers of 
state and local police officers), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t127. pdf; 
id. at 69 tbl . l .72 (providing numbers of federal agents), available at http://www.albany.edu/ 
sourcebook/pdf/t172.pdf. 
63 The history of gambling regulation is chronicled in exhaustive detail in NAT'L INST. OF 
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRI MTNAL jUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
LAw OF GAMBLING: 1776- 1976 ( 1977) . 
6" See, e.g. , Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 37, at 2565-66. 
63 The relationship between scandal and corporate reform initiatives is discussed at length in 
DAVID A. SKEEL, jR., IC.,\RUS I THE BOARDROO I: Tl IE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS I • CORPORATE 
AMERlCA AND WHERE THEY CAI\IIE FROM (2005 ) .  
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corporate America. ,,66 Congress responded by enacting the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, which included sweeping new provisions out­
lawing payments by a firm or any of i ts representatives to foreign offi-. I 6 1 CIa s .  
In response to the insti tutional pressure to ste p  in once again af­
ter the recent Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress further 
augmented the long l ist  of corporate crimes by enacting the Sar­
banes-Oxley Act.68 In addition to sharply increasing the punishments 
under numerous existing provisions, the legislation added a slew of 
new penalties for "any person who attempts or conspires to commit" 
a securities offense ( punishable to the same extent as the offense in 
question) ; 69 for tampering with a record (up to twenty years in 
prison) ; 70  for destroying, altering, or falsifying records and documents 
to impede or obstruct any federal investigation ( twenty years) ;7l and 
for retaliating against informants ( ten years) .72 In effect, these provi­
sions announce that any future corporate executive who does any of 
the bad things Enron 's executives did will have violated the criminal 
code . Congress completed the sweep by adding a broad new catch-all 
provision that makes it a crime (punishable by up to twenty-five years 
in prison) to "knowingly execute [ ] , or attempt [ J  to execute , a 
scheme or artifice . . .  to defraud any person in connection with any . , ,73 secunty. 
Many of the other provisions in the corporate responsibility le gis­
lation are civil in fonn, including provisions requiring the company's 
executives to certify its financial statements74 and to establish an in­
ternal compliance program.75 But these, too , expand the scope of po­
ten tial criminal liability, due to the fact that section 2 1  of the 1 934 
Securities Act defines every knowing and willful violation of the secu­
rities laws as a crime. 76 As a result, every time Congress adds a new 
civil liability provision, it automatically adds another crime to the fed-
66 William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Content of Corporate Federalism, 
UCLA Law & Econ. Workshop 45 ( discussion draft Aug. 30, 2004) , available at h ttp:/ / 
repositories.cdlib.org/ cgi/viewcon tent.cgi?article= 1 09 1  &con text=berkeley _law _econ. 
67 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L .  No. 95-2 1 3, sec. 1 02 ,  § 1 3 ( b ) , sec .  J 03, 
§§  30A, 32, 91  Stat. 1494 ( 1 977) ( codified as amended at 15 U.s.c.  §§ 78m (b) , 78dd-l to -2, 78ff 
(2000 » . 
68 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 1 1 6 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 1 1 , 1 5, 18 , 28, and 29 U.s.c. (Supp. II 2002» . 
69 Sec. 902, § 1 349 ( codified as amended at 1 8  U.s.c. § 1 349 (Supp. 11 2002» . 
70 Sec. 1 1 02,  § 1 5 1 2  (codified as amended at 1 8  U.s.c. § 1 5 1 2  (Supp. II 2002» . 
71 Sec. 802, § 1 5 1 9  ( codified as amended at 1 8  U.s.C. § 1 5 1 9  (Supp. II 2002» . 
72 Sec. 1 1 07, § 1 5 1 3  (codified as am�nded at 1 8  U.S.C. § 1 5 1 3  (Supp. II 2002» . 
73 Sec. 807, § 1 348 (codified as amended at 18 U.s.c.  § 1 348 (Supp. I I  2002» . 
74 § 302 ( codified as amended at 1 5  U .S.c.  § 7241 (Supp. II 2002» . 
70 § 404 ( codified as amended at 1 5  U .s.c. § 7268 (Supp. II 2002» . 
76 Securities Exchange Act of l934, 1 5  U.s.c.  § 78u ( 2000) . 
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eral code. Together, the explicit crimes in title 1 8  of the U.S.  Code 
and the implicit ones hidden in the securities laws comprise a vast, 
ongoing effort to define the contours of business morality. 
As with federal vice laws, most of these provisions will be enforced 
both rarely and idiosyncratically. Mter an initial flurry of activity, 
companies and their executives will adjust to the new provisions. 
Companies and executives that are inclined to push the envelope or 
cheat will invariably find ways to maneuver around the new rules, 
much as Enron did in designing the off-balance-sheet p artnerships it 
used to hide liabilities. 
When regulators do try to enforce the morality reflected in the 
corporate misconduct provisions of the federal code, the result is of­
ten chaos. Martha Stewart's brush with the insider trading rules is a 
telling illustration . As construed by the SEC and Supreme Court, 
even if the defendant owes no duty to the company whose stock is be­
ing traded, she is liable _if she buys or sells stock in violation of any 
kind of duty to anyone . / I  In Stewart's  case, the theory was that her 
broker violated his duties as a broker when he told Stewart that the 
founder of ImClone was selling his stock, and that Stewart inherited 
this duty because she was a "tippee."  What Stewart did was immoral , 
but it did not fit within any coherent, realistically enforceable theory 
of insider trading. 78 Regulators could never enforce these standards 
against more than the tiniest percentage of violators, which means 
that the real moral of the Stewart saga is this : don ' t  be Martha Stew­
art-don ' t  be the kind of famous, controversial person whom regula­
tors might single out for enforcement. Moralist criminal law turns 
out not to be particularly moral. 
As the law has grown more moralist, academic legal literature has 
devoted ever more attention to expressive theories of law, particularly 
criminal law. Expressivism and moralism are a natural pair: both 
hold that law exists not just to govern, but to teach.79 Robert Ellickson 
77 See United States v. O' Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 ( 1 997) (endorsing a "misappropriation" 
theory of insider trading liability) . 
78 In Stewart's case, the difficulty was compounded by the perception that her broker's be­
havior was not unusual-that is, that many brokers tell their clients about developments such as 
a sale of stock by a high-level execu tive of a company in which the client owns stock. If this per­
ception is accurate, the brokers' duty is a duty in name, but not one that is followed in practice. 
79 Compare Dan 1. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.  REv. 349, 
351 ( 1997) ("Given the power of social influence, laws that shape individuals' perceptions of 
each others' beliefs and intentions . . .  may often turn out to be the most cost-effective means of 
deterring c�e ." ) ,  Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theo?) of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 
1 649 , 1 691  ( 2000) [hereinafter McAdams, Focal Point Theo·ry] (discussing the " labeling power" of  
law) , and Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REv. 338, 341 ( 1 997) [hereinafter McAdams, Norms] ( advocating "the use of norms in economic 
analysis of law" ) ,  with Will iam J .  Stun tz, Christian Legal Themy, 1 1 6  HARv. L. REv. 1 707, 1 733-34 
(2003) ( reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES 0 LEGAL TJ IOCGHT ( Michael W. McConnell et al. 
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famously wrote about the way the farmers of Shasta County, Califor­
nia generated a system of "order without law"-the title of Ellickson 's 
wonderful book-through the inculcation and application of social 
norms.80 An important strand of legal scholarship has turned Ellick­
son ' s  insight on its head, arguing that while social norms govern pri­
vate conduct, legal rules shape social norms. These law-and-norms 
scholars, led by Dan Kahan and Richard McAdams, have focused 
much of their attention on criminal law and on the way different le­
gal rules can produce healthier norms.Sl 
This is moralism with different terminology. Instead of saying that 
criminal law does and should teach good morals , norms scholars say 
that the law should promote healthy norms-different language but 
the same concept. Also, norms theories face the same basic problem 
as moralist the ories of criminal law: there is too much immorality. 
When legal codes try to play the role of moral codes, the result is that 
law ceases to function as law. We do not mean to suggest that the 
criminal law has no role to play in reinforcing healthy moral values. 
But purely symbolic laws have a very different effect. The more space 
the federal criminal code covers , the greater the ratio of crimes to 
prosecutions; the greater that ratio is , the more prosecutors-no t  the 
law-define the bounds of criminal liability. This might not be so if 
prosecutors simply prosecuted violators randomly, but enforcement 
discretion n ever works that way. Law enforcers draw the lines they 
like , or use their line-drawing P?wer to extract information or to 
"take down" famous defendants .82 Whatever the enforcement pat­
tern, the message the law sends is bound to be different than the 
message embodied in the relevan t  statute . That is not likely to teach 
good morals or promote healthy norms, and it is not likely to delight 
anyone 's soul. 
Fraud prosecutions send the message that leading politicians ,  like 
Clinton or Henry Cisneros,83 and celebrities like Stewart, are subject 
eds. ,  200 1 »  (discussing a kind of moralism that "begins with the claim that law's highest goal is 
to identify classes of behavior that are not just socially wasteful or inefficient but evil, and then 
to stamp them out" ) ,  and Smntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, supra note 4,  at 1 840-4 1 ("The great 
difficulty with [morals crimes] may be too little moralism. As the name suggests, morals 
crimes . . .  depend more than do other crimes on the strength of the norms that undergird 
them. At the same time, those norms are more fragile than for other crimes ." ) . 
80 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How N EIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1 3- 1 20 
( 1 99 1 )  . 
8 1  See, e. g. ,  Kahan, supra note 79; McAdams, Focal Point Theory, supra note 79; McAdams, 
Norms, supra note 79. For an excellent critique of expressive theories of law, see M atthew D.  
Adler, Expressive Theories of  Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L .  REv. 1 363 (2000) . 
82 See, e.g. ,  Richman & Stuntz, supra note 3 (discussing the prosecutions of AI Capone, Mar­
tha Stewart, Bill Clinton, and other prominent defendants ) .  
8:1 
For a discussion of the prosecution of Cisneros, see Will iam J Stun tz , Reply: Criminal 
Law 's Patholo,l!J, 10 1 MICH. L. REv. 828, 833 & n . 24 (2002) . 
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to one standard (anything we can prove , we prosecute) , while the rest 
of the population is subject to another, or to no standard at alL 
Prosecutions for immigratio n  violations send the message that those 
suspected of terrorism wil l  be convicted of anything the governmen t  can 
pin on them. Drug prosecutions send the message that one norm 
applies on city streets and another in suburban malls-and, to a large 
extent, that one norm applies to Mrican-Americans and another to 
whites. Those messages do indeed teach,  but what they teach most 
effectively is cynicism about legal institutions. 
Notwithstanding legal theorists '  optimism about law's ability to 
teach wisdom or express our society 's  highest ideals , there is no rea­
son to believe that criminal codes can accomplish these goals. VVhen 
lawmakers try, the effort usually backfires. Prohibition did not pro­
duce an alcohol-free culture any more than contemporary law en­
forcement crusades have produced a culture that is drug-free .  ( I t  
seems closer to th e truth to say that our culture is drug-obsessed, per­
haps in response to the law's  ceaseless efforts to fine-tune what sub­
stances Americans can and cannot consume . )  Criminal bans on 
abortion did not reinforce the social norm against that prac tice ;  on 
the contrary, the norm fell apart while those bans were still in place.84 
Even in the realm of civil justice ,  legal rules do not seem to move the 
culture in productive directions. As Michael Klarman 's  fine book on 
race and the Supreme Court shows, the greatest effect of Brown v. 
Board of Education85 was to prompt still greater intransigence on the 
part of Southern segregationists. 8 
That last example deserves a li ttle elaboration. Plainly, law played 
a central role in the civil rights movement; equally plainly, law made a 
difference-a large difference-in American life.  I t  seems fair to say 
that, at least to some degree, the landmark civil righ ts legislation of 
the 1 960s taught racial toleration. All of which sounds inconsistent 
with the claim that law governs best when i t  seeks only to govern , not 
to teach people how to live . The inconsistency is smaller than it  first 
appears. Neither Brown v. Board of Education nor the Civil Rights Act 
of 1 96487 is chiefly responsible for teaching white Americans to treat 
84 Common estimates of the number of illegal abortions during the 1960s, before Roe v. 
Wade, 4 1 0  U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1 973 ) ,  range from 500,000 to 1 .5 million. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COU RTS BRI NG ABOUT SOGIAL CHAl'\lGE? 353-55 & tbLA1 ( 1 99 1 )  (analyzing 
the impact of Roe v. Wade, taking into account historical estimates of illegal abortions) . 
85 347 U.S. 483 .,954) . 
86 
See MICHAEL]' KLA.RMAN, FROYljlM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT Al'\lD THE 
STRUGGLE: FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 385-42 1 (2004) (discussing and analyzing the righ tward 
movement in the post-BTOwn Southern politics of race, and noting the tendency of previously 
moderate politicians to embrace racial extremism ) .  
87 Pub. L. o .  88-352, 78 Stat. 2 4 1  (codified as amended a t  42 USc. § §  2000a to h-6 
(2000 » . 
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their black neighbors like equals . The key teaching was done in the 
decade between those two legal events by Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
by the movement that he led. King and other civil rights leaders gave 
violent white segregationists the opportunity to show the world who 
and what they were . The world watched, and the result was an 
emerging national consensus in favor of civil rights for Mrican­
Americans.88 The civil rights legislation of the 1960s did not  cause 
that consensus. Actually, causation ran the other way: changed 
minds and hearts among No rthern whites (and more than a few 
Southern whites,  as well) led Congress to conclude that support for 
civil rights was both morally sound and politically advantageous . 
To be sure , civil-rights legislation mattered; it  was a strong force 
for good. But the reasons why it worked so well do not suggest opti­
mism about contemporary efforts to use law to advance moral agen­
das . The most important reason is that the key pieces of legislation­
the 1 964 Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1 96589-had direct, tangi­
ble consequences that did not depend on discretionary decisions of 
police officers or prosecutors .  Jim Crow laws were invalidated. 90 Vot­
ing rules had to be pre-cleared with the Justice Department.91 Most 
importan t of all ,  victims of discrimination could sue and seek mone­
tary relief from their victimizers. 92 
These tangible consequences meant that the law in action-the 
law that ordinary citizens experienced, the law that redressed wrongs 
and punished wrongdoers-was, in all essentials , the same as the law 
on the books .  For the most part, civil rights law functioned as law: 
defining rights, wro ngs, and remedies. That is very different from the 
role law plays in most regulatory regimes, civil as well as criminal. 
Not coincidentally, civil rights law also reinforced healthy moral mes­
sages that the larger society had already begun to absorb. Perhaps 
the lesson is this: law can indeed teach, but only when its chief object 
lies elsewhere. In  governance as in life ,  most people learn by exam­
ple.  Moral messages are more likely to be received, and less likely to 
>!I! One of the best accounts is Taylor Branch's monumental three volume history of the King 
years. See generally TAYLOR BRAl"'lCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA I. THE KIl\G YEARS 1 954-63 
( 1989 ) ;  TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: fuvlERJCA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65 ( 1 998 ) ;  TAYLOR 
BRANCH, AT CANAAl'l ' S  EDGE: fuVlERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1 965-68 (2006 ) .  
89 Pub . L .  No. 89- 1 10 ,  79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 4 2  U.s.C. § §  197 1-74e (2000» . 
90 See Civil Rights Act § 202 (codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. § 2000a-l ( 2000» (prohibit­
ing discrimination and desegregation "purport [ing] to be required by any law, statute, ordi­
nance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof' ) . 
91 See Voting Rights Act § 5 (codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. § 1973c (2000» (barring 
changes in voting rules by covered jurisdictions absent either judicial review or advance permis­
sion from the Justice Department) . 
92 See, e.g. , Civil Rights Act § 706 (g) ( codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-5 ( 2000» 
(granting courts discretion to fashion equitable relief, including monetary back-pay awards, for 
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be garbled, when the message is acted out, not just written In code 
books and case reporters . 
All of which is to say that law works best when its ambitions are 
modest. Humility turns out to be a better regulatory strategy than ar­
rogance.  Identifying the most destructive wrongs, doing so in terms 
that allow for fair, accurate adjudication , matching the scope of the 
criminal code to the resources of the police forces and prosecutors ' 
offices that must enforce i t-these are achievable goals. They are also 
worthy goals: a society whose criminal law meets these objectives is 
likely to have a criminal j ustice system that con trols crime and does 
justice .  The grander ambitions our law seems to have-to define a 
code of proper business practice or proper alcohol and drug use and 
to shape moral norms more generally-are not achievable .  They are 
proper jobs for ethicists and philosoph ers ,  or perhaps doctors and 
economists,  but not for lawyers and judges .93 
Not coinciden tally, they are also proper subjects for the moral law 
about which Jesus preached in the Sermon on the Mount. That law 
makes for very good morals , but very bad positive law. I t  is  a lesson 
our secular legal system would do well to learn . 
I I I .  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD 'S LAw AND MAN 'S 
Conservative Christians could stand to learn the same lesson. The 
New Testament makes abundantly clear that law cannot save souls; 
salvation must come through other means and from another Source. 
In the apostle Paul ' s  letters ,  law is not the mechanism of salvation ; 
rather, law shows the need of it.94 Paul repeatedly warns Christians 
about the dangers of converting their faith into a moral code,95 just as 
Jesus condemned the Pharisees for doing the same thing to their own 
faith and thus weighing down the people with burdens too heavy to 
93 Noah Feldman 's recent proposal to "offer greater lati tude for religious speech and sym­
bols in public debate, but also impose a stricter ban on state financing of religious institutions 
and activities," is problematic for closely related reasons. Noah Feldman, il Church-State Solution, 
.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005,  § 6 ( Magazine ) ,  at 28; see also NOAH FELDi'vIAN, D IVlDED BY GOD: 
AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005) (providi ng 
historical context for the conflict over the proper line between church and state and proposing 
reconciliation between the posi tions of "values evangelism" and "legal secularism" through ex­
panding acceptance of symbolic religious expression while enforcing rigid formal separation 
between religious institutions and the state ) .  As a resolution of the First Amendment culture 
wars, Feldman's proposal seems to us exactly backwards. Because symbolic legislation (such as 
putting "In God We Trust" on coins) does not have tangible consequences, lawmakers are far 
too quick to embrace it. In the absence of real consequences, there is simply not enough of a 
check on bad lawmaking. 
94 l1l.g. , Romans 7 :7-25 (elaborating on the difference between God's law and man 's law) . 
9'> E.g. , Galatians 3: �0-29 (distinguishing the law from the covenant between God and Abra­
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carry.96 One might expect  professing Christians to be especially at­
tun e d  to the dangers of legal moralism. Judging from contemporary 
cultu re-wars debates, we are not. The heart of the problem is a ten­
dency to confuse God' s  law with man's.  Those of us who believe in a 
divin e  moral law are regularly tempted to try to write that law into 
our much-less-than-divine code books. 
Among American evangelicals, this tendency was reinforced by 
the j u dicially mandated legalization of abortion in 1 973, which galva­
nized theologically conservative Catholics and Protestants alike and 
spurred a long, still-ongoing campaign to flip the legal switch back.97 
The reasoning was and is quite straightforward: abortion is a serious 
wrong. I t  should therefore be outlawed, not legally protected.  
Whether or  not one finds this logic persuasive , it  is bedeviled by a 
striking irony in the practical world of American politics: the cam­
paign against abortion seems to have been strengthened, not weak­
ened, by the fact that pro-life evangelicals no longer have the law on 
their side . In the 1 960s, abortion was a crime, and its public image 
was largely defined by the gruesome deaths . that women risked when 
they sought illegal, black-market abortions.98 Thanks in large part to 
that image , the campaign to l iberalize abortion laws prospered. Since 
Roe v. Wade,99 the public face of abortion has switched sides .  In place 
of deaths from back-alley abortions, public attention focuses on 
deaths of almost-born infants in partial birth abortions. loo Just as the 
first set  of deaths were not representative of ordinary experience un­
der the law that preceded Roe v. Wade, partial birth abortions are not 
representative of the mass of abortions that have taken place since 
that case .  But different laws produce different public scandals . 
Different scandals produce different politics. When the public is 
sharply divided about the rights and wrongs of some class of conduct, 
both sides of the debate will strive to use extreme and inflammatory 
cases against one another. But only one side will succeed. The law 
gives that devastatingly powerful weapon to the side that loses the legal 
debate , be they abortion rights proponents in the 1 960s or pro-life 
advocates today. \Nhen even first-trimester abortions were cnmes, 
9 U  Matthew 23:2-36 (quoting Jesus' condemnation of the teachers of the law and Pharisees ) .  
97 The argument in this paragraph is developed i n  greater detail i n  Will iam J. Stuntz, Self 
Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REv. 1871 , 1 886-89 (2000 ) .  
98 See id. at 1 887-88 ("In 1 960, Newsweek ran a story titled The Abortion Racket, estimating that 
five thousand women died each year from illegal abortions . . . .  Th [is] and other accounts con­
tributed to the grmving sense in some circles that criminal abortion laws were wrong, even bar­
baric." (internal citations omitted» . 
99 4 1 0  U.S. 1 13 ( 1 973) . 
100 
One measure of the comparative salience of back-alley abortions and partial birth abor­
tions is references to each in the print media. A recent search (conducted March 22, 2006) of 
Westlaw's "All News" database found 1 80 1  stories mentioning back-alley abortions since January 
1 ,  1 990. With partial birth abortion, the database stopped counting at 1 0,000 stories. 
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partial birth abortions did not exist. Now that abortion is a constitu­
tional righ t, deaths from back-alley abortions are much less common 
than they once were . IOl ( Even in the 1960s, the� were less common 
than the popular press led people to believe . I 2 ) Both times, the 
weapon-the ability of a vocal minority to reference cases or statutes 
to inflame citizens-played a large role in turning public opinion. 
Support for legalized abortion grew in the 1960s, just as opposition to 
it has grown since the early 1 990s . 103 The consequences can be seen 
not just in political rhetoric,  but also in prac tical conduct. The num­
ber of abortions rose steeply in the years leading uB to Roe.
, o'l That 
number has declined stee ply in the years since 1 980. 05 The abortion 
rate co uld well be lower today than it  was the year before Roe was de­
cided. When the relevant legal territory is morally con tested, the 
law's weaponry tends to wound those who wield it. Legal victory pro� 
duces cultural and political defeat. 
Evangelicals-especially conservative evangelicals-have been 
similarly united in opposing gambling and have treated legal prohibi­
tions as the principal tool in the cultural debate on that subject. 
Evangelicals have comprised much of the opposition to lo ttery initia­
tives in South Carolina, Alabama, and elsewhere; they are the most 
visible opponents of the recent movement to allow race tracks to in­
troduce slot machines. 1 06 The cover of a recent issue of a publication 
of the evangelical group, the Pennsylvania Family Institute , warned of 
the "false promises of funding schools and social programs with ca­
sino gambling" and urged its members to circulate citizens' petitions 
1 0 1  
Lucinda M. Finley, The Story of Roe v. Wade: From a Garage Sale for Women 's Lib, to the Su­
preme COUlt, to Political Turmoil, in CONSTITUTIONAL L\W STORIES 359, 40 1 (Michael  C. Dorf ed. ,  
2004) ("The principal practical consequence of Roe was to dramatically increase the safety of 
abortion.") (c iting Center for Disease Control statistics) . 
1 02 
SeeJeffrey Rosen, The D(ty After Roe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2006, at 56, 62 (suggesting 
that articles in Newsweek and The Saturday Evening Post exaggerated by "at least a factor of 
ten"  the num ber of deaths from abortions) .  
103 
The debate over partial birth abortion is not the only source of the change in public atti­
tudes. The increasingly widespread availability of sonograms has likewise been used by an ti­
abortion groups in attempting to strengthen opposition to abortion. See, e.g. , Neela Baneljee, 
Church Groups Tum to Sonogram to Turn Women from Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at Ai (dis­
cussing church groups' purchases of ultrasound machines) . 
104 
See ROSENBERG, supra note 84, at 353-55 ( l isting and discussing the estimated number of  
illegal abortions performed each year up until the Roe decision ) .  
105 
See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Ab01tion Incidence and Seroices in the United 
States in 2000, PERSP. 0 SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH , Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 6, 8 tbl . l  (showing a 
twenty-seven percent decline in the abortion rate between 1 980 and 2000 ) ,  available at http :/  / 
www .guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3500603.pdf. 
106 Evangelical opposition to gambling is discussed in more detail in David A. Skeel Jr. , VVhen 











834 JOURNAL OF CONSl1TU770NAL LA W [Vol. 8 : 4  
and lobby their lawmakers to oppose Pennsylvania legislation that 
would authorize race track slots.  107 
Judging by th e last  century of criminal law enforcement, gam­
bling's religious opponents may have bet on the wrong horse . At 
least since the early twentieth century, federal and state criminal 
codes have banned most forms of gambling. Those criminal proh ibi­
tions may have taught some Ame ricans that gambling is wrong, but 
they seem to have taught millions of others to ignore the law's  com­
mands. Far from disappearing in the face of such prosc riptions, 
gambling simply wen t  underground. Bookmake rs and numbers 
racke ts took the place of casinos and legal lotteries . I DS Gambling was 
too ubiquitous for the government to punish across the board, so the 
line between what was forbidden and what was tolerated was a matter 
of prosecutors' discretion . lo9 In practice, the line differed depending 
on the class of the customers .  Police might raid the numbers rackets 
that flourished in poor immigran t and working-class neighborhoods, 
but they mostly left upscale bookmakers alone. l ID This class-base d  
discrimination was a rational response to limited enforcement re­
sources: it was far easier to police numbers games, which were often 
out in the open, than to track down more discreet bookmakers and 
their well-heeled clients. Going after lower-class gambling made 
sense as a way to get the biggest bang for th e buck. But the bang 
turned out not to be as big as it seemed: the perception that gam­
bling was a crime if you lived in the wrong neiRhborhood bred con­
tempt for the laws that did the criminalizing. 1 In turn , this con­
tempt eroded the very moral principles on which the prohibition was 
based. 
If evangelicals could assemble a majority coalition in the current 
environment-resisting or even reversing the expansion of racetrack 
gambling, for instance, or heading off new lottery initiatives-we 
migh t see a similar dynamic at work. Millions of Americans do not 
believe gambling is immoral / 12 and a wave of new gambling prohibi-
107 
Clem Boyd, Slots faT Tots Would Gamble Away OUT FutuTe', PA. FAMS. & SCHOOLS, Spring 
2002, at 4. The campaign was to no avail, as the legislation passed. See, e.g. , Editorial, Pennsyl­
vania 's Slots Sleaze, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2005, at A24 (describing and criticizing the effects of the 
legislation) . 
IO� 
See Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, supm note 4, at 1804 & nn. 1 1- 12 (discussing persistent 
trends in gambling over time) .  
11"-' 
See id. at 1819-24 (discussing the peculiar policing and prosecutorial concerns involved in 
consensual crimes l ike gambling) . 
1 10 
See id. at 1804-19 (discussin g  the different effects of consensual crimes on neighborhoods 
of different classes) . 
I I I  
See id. a t  1804, 1807, 1825-26. 
1 12 
See, e.g., Skeel, supm note 106 (manuscrip t  at 1 4  n.29, on file wi th University of Pen nsyl­
vania Journal of Constitutional Law) (citing a 2003 Barna poll finding that sixty-one percent of 
all Americans, bu t only twenty-seven percent of evangelicals, approve of gambling) . 
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tions could increase that number if those on the margin recoil at the 
effort to legislate morality or the inconsistent enforcement of the 
prohibition. This points to another danger in trying to make the 
statute books mirror the law of God: the enterprise distracts religious 
believers from other, more limited efforts that migh t command wide­
spread support. If they were not so c losely linke d  with the campaign 
to prohibit gambling, evangelicals might speak with greater moral au­
thority when criticizing, say, state governments' all-out efforts to 
promote their own lotteries .  The same states that force welfare re­
cipients to work for their bread also run advertisements featu ring lot­
tery winners bragging that " I ' ll never have to work another day in my 
l ife . " l J3 Religious believers sometimes criticize these cynical cam­
paigns to put more cash in government coffers, but the message is 
muddled by the not-unfounded perception that their real goal is to 
use the law's sword to outlaw all gambling. 
Th e tendency of legal moralism to backfire extends beyond cul­
turally contentious issues like abortion and gambling. The world of 
corporate finance tends to prompt a moralism of the left, with politi­
cally liberal Christians seeking to enforce God's  law in corporate 
boardrooms. Jim Wallis, editor of the liberal evangelical magazine 
Sojourners and author of the best-selling book God 's Politics, praises 
Congress for its recent efforts to promote corporate responsibility: 
The Senate finally passed unanimously a series o f  accounting and 
corporate regulatory measures considerably tougher than what the p resi­
dent had suggested.  They i ncluded, by a 97-to-0 vote , a new chapter i n  
the criminal code that makes any "scheme or artifice" to defraud stock-
. . I f:C 1 1 4  holders a cnmma O lense . 
Wallis then quotes and endorses Senator Patrick Leahy's assessment: 
If you steal a $500 te levision set, you can go to jai l .  Apparen tly if you steal 
$500 million from your corporation and your pe nsion holders and every­
one else, th en nothing happens. [The cor�9rate responsibility legisla­
tio n ]  makes sure something will happen . . . . l:> 
1 1 3 
The "never work another day" ad ran in Pennsylvania. In a notoriolls New Yo rk ad, a 
mother made fun of her daughter for studying so hard to try to earn a college scholarship. No 
need to worry, the mother suggested; she'd taken care of the fami ly's financial problems by buy­
ing a lottery ticket. JOHN R.  HILL & GARY PALM ER, S.C. POLICY COUNCIL EDUC. FOU N D . ,  GOING 
FOR BROKE: THE Eco, OMIC AJ'\iO SOCIAL IMPACT OF A SOUTH CAROL! 'A LOTTERY 26 (Gerry Dick­
inson ed. , 2000) (describing the New York ad) , 
1 1 4 
JIM WALLIS, GOD'S POLITICS: WHY THE RIGHT GETS IT WRONG AND THE LEFT DOESN 'T GET 
IT: A NEW VISION FOR FAITH AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 263 (2005) .  This is the catch-all criminal 
antifraud provision discussed earlier. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-204, Sec. 
807, § 1 348,  1 1 6 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 18 USc. § 1 348 (Supp. II  2002) ) ;  supm text 
accompanying note 68 . 
1 1 5  
WALLIS, supm note 1 1 4, at 263 (quoting Senator Leahy as reported in Sean Gonsalves, 
WTO Protesters Appear Prophetic, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 1 6, 2002, at B5 ) . Wallis's dis­
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The suggestion is that laws can be used as an instrument to teach the 
next generation of corporate executives how to behave and reshape 
corporate culture . 
I t  isn ' t  likely to work out that way. Title 1 8  of the United States 
Code already includes several hundred laws banning various kinds of 
fraud and misrepresentation. I 1 6  Adding a few more is like adding new 
rules to the tax code: corporate crooks, like rich taxpayers, will pay 
their lawyers to find new ways to maneuver around the rules. Nearly 
everyone agrees that there was a serious breakdown in corporate 
America at the outset of the twenty-first century and that corporate 
eth ics were a large part of the problem. But new criminal p rohibi­
tions are more l ikely to undermine managers ' sense of moral respon­
sibility than to promote it .  Every parent understands this point: 
given a choice between saying "don ' t  hurt your sister" and "here is a 
list of fifteen ways you migh t  hurt your sister-don ' t  do any of these ,"  
wise parents opt for the first approach. Most children,  when they are 
presented with a list of fifteen things not to do, will quickly come up 
with a sixteenth that is not on the list. 1 1 7  Detailed codes that try to de­
fine misconduct comprehensively tend to produce the same reac tion.  
Complying with the law becomes an exercise in ticket-punching, fol­
lowing mechanical legal formulae . Regulated actors exe rcise their 
creativity by looking for ways to evade legal norms-like taxpayers fill­
ing out their tax forms every April 15 , trying all the while to hold on 
to every penny they can. 
"\Then corporate regulation looks like the tax code , corporate ex­
ecutives respond like taxpayers . Given a list of dos and don ' ts ,  many 
will find themselves thinking more about what they can get away with 
and less about what is honorable and right. Rather than cultivating a 
sense of moral responsibility, a comprehensive set of rules may simply 
function as an obstacle course , a set of barriers around which corpo­
rate officers must maneuver. I 1 8  As with legal efforts to resolve con ten-
of the scandals. Jim Wallis, Hearts & NIinds: 77�e Sin of Enron, SOJOUR.!'-JERS MAG., Mar.-Apr. 
2002, at 7, 8 ( "Maybe this time we will demand that stronger stock trading regulations, account­
ing regulations, and a complete campaign finance reform overhaul be at the top of the political 
agenda. " ) .  
1 1 6  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
1 1 7 
Note that the opposite strategy-the one used by parents-is problematic when trans­
planted to the law. Vague prohibitions like "cause no harm" grant broad discretion to prosecu­
tors and regulators. That is as likely to backfire as is a long list of irregularly enforced rules. 
The lesson is not that law regulates best through standards rather than rules, but that law makes 
a poor parent. The best parents are good moral educators, which legislators and judges are 
not. 
l IS 
The most widely debated provision of the recent corporate responsibility reforms-a re­
quirement that companies put an extensive internal control system in place and that the CEO 
certifies the firm's efforts to do so-is a good illustration. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1 5  U.s.c.  
§ 7262 (Supp. II 2002) (establishing the requirements for internal control provisions) . Much of 
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tious issues in our social life ,  legal efforts to define and enforce a 
code of economic morality produce a kind of reverse alchemy, turn­
ing the gold of good morals into dross. 
It gets worse . Prosecutors cannot hope to enforce white-collar 
criminal law across the board; they must be selective . The most obvi­
ous way to select targets is to investigate every high-profile corporate 
bankruptcy. The moral message becomes not "don ' t  lie" but "don ' t  
fail"-not the best message to send budding entrepreneurs .  
Why do evangelical Christians find it so  hard to resist the attrac­
tions of legal moralism? One answer is h istorical. Early in the twen­
tieth century, evangelicals disengaged from American politics, partly 
in response to the spread of secular modernismJ l9 and partly in reac­
tion to the debacle of Prohibition and its repeal . Starting in the 
1940s, evangelical leaders ,  many of them connected to Christianity 
Today, the principal voice of conservative evangelicalism , began call­
ing for a renewed commitment on the part of believers to engage and 
influence the culture around them. "From Carl Henry and Harold 
Ockenga in the 1 940s and 1950s," as Christian Smith puts it, "to 
Francis Schaeffer and Mark Hatfield in the 1 960s and 1 970s, to 
Charles Colson and Anthony Campolo in the 1980s and 1 990s, evan­
gelicals have been driven by a vision of redemptive world transforma­
tion.
,, 12o If the end is to transform a law-saturated culture like con­
temporary America's ,  legal reform seems a natural means. Debates 
over legal limits on abortion ,  gambling, and Enron-style corporate 
immorality become tools for healing a spiri tually diseased society. 
But the cure risks worsening the disease . A legal culture that in­
vites selective enforcement ( or no enforcement at all) of controver­
sial laws makes it all too easy to enact such laws. Religious moralists 
need not win the culture in order to enact their preferred moral vi­
sion into law; on the con trary, culture and law can follow separate 
paths .  Law becomes largely symbolic: the vast federal criminal law of 
misrepresentation goes unenforced, save for the occasional Martha 
Stewart or Scooter Libby on whom ambitious prosecutors train their 
sights . 1 2 1 That state of affairs pleases neither moralists nor libertari-
the discussion has centered on the cost of implementing internal controls, bu t the more lasting 
concern is that the requirement will simply function as another hoop through which corporate 
managers must jump. There is a danger that many companies will simply hire a new executive, 
the "corporate compliance officer," but that nothing else will change. Indeed, in some compa­
nies, the formal procedu res could be used to mask a poisonolls corporate cultu re. 
1 19 
For an excellent account that emphasizes the effects of this development on evangelical 
politics, see GEORGE M. MARSD EN, FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERlCAN CULTURE: THE SHAPING OF 
TwENTIETH-CEI TURY EvANGELICALISM 1870-1925 ( 1 980) . 
120 
CHRISTIAN SMITH , AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM: EMBATILED AND TH RIVING 1 78-79 ( 1 998) . 
1 2 1  Scooter Libby, the Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, was indicted in 2005 for 
allegedly lying to prosecutors about the leaked iden tity of CIA employee Valerie Plame. 
: 1  
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ans .  The controversy that surrounded Terri Schiavo 's  death in the 
spring of 2005 , together with the federal legislation and litigation that 
preceded it, is the latest example of the phenomenon . 122 It wil l  not 
be the last. 
The problem with the Schiavo legislation was not that the subject 
matter-the circumstances under which doctors may remove feeding 
tubes from comatose patients-is inherently inappropriate or incom­
patible with wise legal regulation . Rather, the problem was that even 
those supporting the regulation did not wish to apply it to any cases 
but Schiavo 's .  That is a recipe for bad lawmaking. If those of us who 
believe that Terri Schiavo deserved better than she got cannot per­
suade our fellow citizens to require that all those in Schiavo 's  circum­
stances receive better treatment, we should not seek, and lawmakers 
should not offer, "rules" that are not rules at all ,  but merely symbolic 
("hypocritical" might be a better word) affirmations of norms that the 
citizenry is unwilling to live by. 
The Schiavo case is an extreme version of a sadly common phe­
nomenon. Legal moralists seek to ban some class of conduct that 
most of the population either wishes to engage in or is happy to tol­
erate . In a society that truly honored the rule of law, such bans could 
not pass muster, because the laws in question could never be fully en­
forced. In our system, such bans are a common means of political 
market segmentation , an attempt to mollify religious conservatives 
without offending secular libertarians . That result should displease 
both groups. Legal moralism does not, in the end, advance the In­
terests of moralists-or anyone else, for that matter. 
In short, legal moralism is nearly always counterproductive . In 
Christian terms, it is also deeply wrong. Jesus ' definitions of adultery 
and murder proved that immorality and illegali ty cannot and must 
not be coextensive . 1 23 God's  law reigns over a broad empire that 
man's  law cannot hope to govern. Good moral principles are often 
vague and open-ended, and they reach into every nook and cranny of 
our lives and our thoughts .  Legal principles that have these qualities 
only serve to invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Arbi­
trariness and discrimination in turn invite contempt for the law. 
Moral education becomes an exercise in educating the public in bad 
morals . The same thing happens if lawmakers choose a long list of 
rigid rules in place of vague moral principles, as our experience with 
122 
The Schiavo case has already generated an enormous amount of writing. For one of the 
better arguments in favo r of keeping Schiavo alive and for federal intervention to that end, see 
Peggy Noonan,  In Love With Death, OPINION ]',  Mar. 24, 2005, h ttp://www .opinionjournal .com/ 
columnists/pnoonan/ ? id= 1 1  0006460. For a discussion of  how that case is likely to prove a self� 
inflicted wound for conservative Christians, see John C. Danforth, In the Narne of Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2005,  at A17.  
123 See Matthew 5 : 2 1 -22 (discussing murder) ; Matthew 5 :27-28 (discussing adultery) . 
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trying to define and enforce corporate morality proves .  Targets of 
those rules focus on the rules themselves, on maneuvering through 
legal minefields instead of exercising moral judgment. The law de­
ters the very thing it seeks to promote. It is hard to avoid th e conclu­
sion that the law must draw lines not between right and wrong but 
be tween the most destructive and verifiable wrongs, and everything 
else . 
And mixing God's  law and man 's  law may have other unfortunate 
consequences: distorting religious believers ' understanding of the 
divine law even as it distorts the public ' s  approach to the laws of code 
books and court decisions. Distortion runs,  in other words, in both 
directions. Even as we try to write morality into the statute books, we 
may be tempted to turn God ' s  law into a list of purposeless rules, a 
kind of Biblical version of the Internal Reve nue Code . That is pre­
cisely the tendency that Christ criticized in the Pharisees of h is time­
the tendency to focus on rules rather than relationsh ip with the one 
true God, a tendency that robbed God 's  law both of i ts vas tness and 
of its delight. 
Conflating God ' s  law and man ' s  law thus does violence to both . It 
makes far too much of man 's law, and far too little of God 's .  This re­
alization leads to a surprising implication about contemporary 
American politics : the deep divide between moralists and l ibertarians 
may be needless, the result more of theological error than of spiritual 
disagreement. Libertarians seek to minimize formal legal restraints 
on private conduct. That agenda should hold some appeal for wise 
moralists , at least if the moralists are Christian . After all ,  the rule of 
law is a moral good in Christian terms. And the rule of law is likely to 
be honored best where legal restraints are most modest. The rule of 
good morals , meanwhile , must be honored-if it is to be honored at 
all-in the hearts and minds of the citizenry. Not in its courthouses. 
